|
egrettably,
given the enormity of its occasion—the events of 11
September 2001 and their consequences—Thomas Friedman’s
Longitudes & Attitudes is rather a bathetic book.
But how could it not be? It is surely the rare media
commentator who has ever been able to bring to his
regular, too frequent observations a depth of insight
which makes what he writes transcend its particular
moment to provide more generally applicable instruction.
And Friedman is demonstrably not one of those. Neither,
clearly, is he one of those, a Boswell acquainted with
an at least interesting and perhaps even profound
Johnson, who can then broadcast to others insights
beyond his own capacity to generate. For a Boswell must
be able to at least recognize such insights for what
they are. Besides, Friedman’s “Johnsons” are for the
most part men distinguished by little but their
transitory possession of power or influence, whose
casual remarks he sometimes even describes as “wise.”
To be sure,
Friedman’s book is explicitly based largely on columns
published in the Op-Ed pages of The New York Times.
But both the fact and the nature of the compilation and
its accompanying pieces—an introduction, a prologue,
“The Super-Story,” and a concluding “Diary,” “Travels in
a world without walls: September 11, 2001–July 3, 2002,”
and also an acknowledgments section of some
interest—surely require that the book be treated as a
book. Were one simply reviewing a series of newspaper
columns published over an extended period of time, even
in so august a publication as the Times, the
critical criteria to be applied to them would be rather
different. Yet since his book is so intimately linked to
his journalism, I would wish to suggest—heeding an
ancient suggestion that one may more readily discern
what is written large than what is written small—that
what we may discern in Friedman the author may also tell
something about Friedman the columnist.
It is in his
introduction that one first encounters evidence that
Friedman is not inclined to explore matters deeply. It
is certainly gratifying to those of us who worry about
the wages received for laboring for others that he gets
paid satisfactorily to do something he really enjoys
doing—to be paid to be, as he describes himself, “a
tourist with an attitude” (ix). That is no doubt why he
devotes the entire first paragraph of his
acknowledgements to praising and thanking Arthur
Sulzberger, Jr., and the Sulzberger family. But surely
his claim that he can take any stance he wants on an
issue
|
I have
been the foreign affairs columnist since January
1995, and since then I have never had a
conversation with the Publisher of The New York
Times about any opinion I’ve adopted—before or
after any column I’ve written. (x) |
elides too
casually over such matters of controversy as how media
personnel are selected and how they are then fashioned.
Before Friedman became its foreign affairs columnist in
1995, he had worked for the Times in various
capacities since 1981, advancing fairly steadily through
the ranks. Is it not likely that in these 14 years he
had learned what Robert Darnton termed the “sociology of
the newsroom,” had come to embody, as other successful
employees did, the values of “the good Timesman?”
(See Edwin Diamond, Behind the Times, ch. 8.)
Would he have risen as he did had he not shown that he
belonged, that he could be trusted to fit in? Friedman
may, of course, disagree with such analyses of the
Times and the managerial style of the Sulzberger
family. But his mere assertion of his autonomy does not
begin to come to grips with arguments with which he must
surely be familiar. Mere assertion is, however, one of
Friedman’s favored modes of argument, even in matters he
manifestly takes to be important. So he is hardly likely
to have hesitated to employ it in such a minor matter as
the one addressed here.
Friedman’s
rise, it is also relevant to note, coincided with the
development of the “opinion Times” (Diamond, ch.
9)—rather before television executives discovered the
profitability of “reality TV,” the Times was
discovering how much cheaper it was to deal in opinion
rather than hard news. Longitudes & Attitudes
bears witness to this: how much digging and reporting
could Friedman have done while jetting around from
Washington, D.C., to Kabul, to Jacobabad, Pakistan, to
Washington, to Brussels, and to Washington again,
meeting with others whose vocation it is to be
opinionated, during the last three weeks of January
2002, during which time he also contributed seven
columns. (Thus, by the way, does he come to know what is
the mind-set of “the Arab street”—a favorite collective
concept of his; another is “the electronic herd.” How
does he get away with it when others in this
hyper-rational individualistic age are called to task
for employing collective concepts much more carefully
developed than this?) To be sure,
authenticity-suggesting by-lines do not come cost free.
And neither, no doubt, does Friedman. For he is by now a
skilled entertainer who does not need to be reminded not
to be “too complicated, or too sophisticated”—one of the
six rules of the Times Op-Ed page enunciated by
the deputy editor of that page in 1989 (Diamond,
279-80)—who knows how to shape his columnist persona to
please the Times’ particular audience/market. To
these things, too, does Longitudes & Attitudes
bear witness. That these things help explain his book’s
existence seems further plausible: the audience for the
columns and the audience for the book partially overlap
and mutually reinforce each other, to the material
advantage of both the newspaper publisher and the book
publisher, and Friedman as well.
Friedman’s
disinclination to explore matters deeply is further
evident in his prologue, where he provides what might be
termed the meta-theoretical and theoretical
underpinnings of his twice-weekly columns and the
unifying themes of his book. Those who might be deterred
by the difficulty of such philosophical notions are
quickly encouraged not to worry, for it is a somewhat
condescending Tom Everyman who will be their guide:
I am a big
believer in the idea of the super-story, the notion that
we all carry around with us a big lens, a big framework,
through which we look at the world, order events, and
decide what is important and what is not. (3)
No effeteness
here, this tough-sounding, down-to-earth style
reassures; we are meeting up with a real man’s man—why,
he even, so he tells us in several book acknowledgments
he has published, plays golf for money with guys who
aren’t the least bit interested in ideas. (e.g., 383)
But now the tone begins to shift a little, for an
audience which has been comforted that it need not fear
erudition must nevertheless not be allowed to forget its
place, or his; just a small reminder that he has some
social science should do it.
|
The
events of 9/11 did not happen in a vacuum. They
happened in the context of a new international
system—a system that cannot explain everything but
can explain and connect more things in more
places on more days than anything else. That new
international system is called globalization. . .
. This new system is the lens, the super-story,
through which I viewed the events of 9/11. (3) |
It is
interesting to note, by the way, that despite his own
understanding that the events of 9/11 require
explanation, Friedman seems most hostile to others who
are seeking explanations. Thus, on October 5, 2001, he
is railing against those in the foreign press and in
campus teach-ins whom he portrays as asking why it
happened rather than uttering outright condemnation.
But, then, they can only be making conjectures. He, on
the other hand, is providing to the world the Friedman
theory, which is seemingly so obviously true as to
require no great elaboration and defense in the face of
theoretical or evidentiary criticism and which brooks no
opposition.
Globalization, as he goes on to tell us in his prologue,
is
|
the
inexorable integration of markets, transportation
systems, and communication systems to a degree
never witnessed before—in a way that is enabling
corporations, countries, and individuals to reach
around the world farther, faster, deeper, and
cheaper than ever before, and in a way that is
enabling the world to reach into corporations,
countries, and individuals farther, faster,
deeper, and cheaper than ever before. (3) |
To correctly
understand the events of 9/11, we must, he tells us,
appreciate two major features of globalization. First,
the world is no longer characterized by division. It is
now characterized by integration. We have gone from a
world of walls to a world enwebbed. (4) But, although
“we are all connected and nobody is quite in charge”
now, some of us do not benefit from the new system. And
some—”people who feel overwhelmed by it, homogenized by
it, or unable to keep pace with its demands”—may lash
back at it. (4) But since according to Friedman the
changes are inexorable and seemingly impersonal, we
begin to understand, perhaps, why he takes the views
that he does of those whom the new system disadvantages.
(For some reason I am at this point reminded of Winston
Churchill’s attitude toward the British coal miners back
in 1926: he pitied their condition so long as they
remained passive before the inexorable greed of the coal
owners, but God help them if they dared to try to
do something about it. Paternalists are so predictable.)
The second
major feature of globalization Friedman urges upon his
readers’ attention is built around three overlapping,
interacting “balances”: the “traditional balance of
power between nation-states”; the balance of power
between nation-states and global markets—our world is
defined both by the sole remaining Superpower and by the
newer Supermarkets; and thirdly, there is “the newest
[balance] of all and the most relevant to the events of
9/11,” that between individuals and nation-states
(5)—individuals “super-empowered” by the new
technologies and the new modes of connecting with others
across the face of the earth, “some of [whom] are quite
angry, some of [whom] are quite wonderful” (6)—surely an
interesting comparison, full of implications for the
evaluation of behavior. But is it really the case that
Jody Williams, who worked so hard to rid the world of
land mines, whom Friedman juxtaposes to Osama bin Laden,
was not angry about what was being done to the world?
(6) Besides, Friedman himself allows at several points
in his present text—oddly, in language that seems not to
convey it particularly well—that he is angry. Anger, it
would thus seem, does not constitute a very useful mark
of malevolence.
But there we
have it:
|
You
will never understand the globalization system, or
the front page of the morning paper—or 9/11—unless
you see each as a complex interaction between all
three of these actors: states bumping up against
states, states bumping up against Supermarkets,
and Supermarkets and states bumping up against
super-empowered individuals—many of whom,
unfortunately, are super-empowered angry men. (6) |
That—four
pages, much of them given over to deliberately and not
necessarily fairly chosen examples and exhortation—is
purportedly what informs and unites what follows. Those
who wish more detailed discussion of these notions,
Friedman directs to his previous book, The Lexus and
the Olive Tree. But it is difficult to tell whether
all of the features of the system he sketches here
actually do have a place in that other prolix,
repetitious, assertion- and anecdote-laden account of
the on-going transformation of our world. In short, the
very amorphousness of Friedman’s presentations makes it
difficult to tell exactly what beyond the commonplace
his “super-story” is. Since, however, we inhabit a time
and place in which, as Bob Woodward has now revealed to
us in his recently published Bush At War, such
concepts as “pounding sand” and “boots on the ground”
now figure hugely in the arcane imperial deliberations
of our most high, there is perhaps more to the notion of
“bumping up against” than I have yet been able to figure
out?
The core of
Longitudes & Attitudes consists of 92 columns,
now chapters, each conforming to the 740-word length
requirement set by the Times. The eleven
chapter-columns in the section entitled “Before” first
appeared at a scattering of moments in the nine months
preceding 9/11; the last of these, “Walls,” appeared on
the morning of 11 September itself. This section would
seem to serve at least two functions: to provide some
scene setting for what follows and to establish
Friedman’s intimate, indeed prescient knowledge of the
new world about to be so violently born. The “After”
section is composed of the columns—he seems to have left
almost none of them out—which appeared every three or
four days, with only a couple of brief breaks, between
13 September 2001 and 3 July 2002 (while the beginning
date is obvious, the concluding date remains
unexplained). Here especially, self-portrayed as the
intimate of the powerful and the privileged, the royal,
the economic, intellectual and media élites, in places
most of us will probably never even visit, we encounter
Friedman in his roles as adviser to princes, as
castigating prophet, as international prosecutor and
judge, and as the guide to the perplexed and ignorant
but sovereign Times-reading public through the
intricate by-ways of an alien, troubling hell of a
world. Part of the time, too, we encounter Friedman as a
sort of superhero, “Friedman of the Times,”
risking his all, despite the entreaties of his
daughters, in Kabul, Peshawar, Bethlehem, Jidda, Jakarta
and Tehran, and let us not forget many-mosqued Brussels
(27 January 2002; Diary, 330-337), so that we—and they,
the inhabitants of these distant, usually unusually
benighted, places—might receive enlightenment. (But
thanks to modern technology he has not had to suffer the
fate of those earlier heroes who ventured to
many-towered Ilion; no ten or twenty year absence from
home for him so that order-disrupting injury may be
avenged. Not only that. He could even make sure
distinguished U.S. senators got home too—for, such is
his power, it was he who could call the State Department
from Afghanistan on his cell phone and make it possible
for the Secretary of State to order a military officer
to let Senator Biden and Friedman board a military plane
to Pakistan [Diary, 328-9].) At other times, however,
his language betrays it, he is Tom Everyman, who cannot
be blandished or led astray by overly sophisticated (mis)representations
of reality from bluntly speaking the plain truth of that
reality to power in paternalistic defense not only of
his daughters but of all his fellow citizens.
Having
alluded to Friedman’s literary style at several points,
let me note one of its particularly disquieting
features: his tendency to make his points through
appeals to authority. Notwithstanding his openly
expressed contempt for media experts—indeed, his column
on the virtues of golf and the Golf Channel could be
taken to reveal him to be a self-hating pundit (21 April
2002)—he again and again relies on “the Middle East
expert,” “the foreign policy expert,” etc., quite a
number of whom would appear, from his acknowledgments,
to be his personal friends. So long ago as 1989 Edward
Said chided him for his reliance on “trusted gurus”
whose opinions he self-servingly “palms off . . . as
reasonable, uncontested, secure” (reprinted in The
Politics of Dispossession, ch. 34). In fact, most of
the criticism Said then directed at Friedman, from his
tone, to his mode of argumentation, to his
simplification of complex issues, to his
contradictoriness, would seem to apply to the book
presently under review. It may even be, as with his
repeated reliance on a few friendly experts, that these
flaws have become more pronounced as he has grown in
confidence and acclaim. But, of course, Said is not
someone I would expect Friedman to pay much heed to.
When not
relying on argument from authority, Friedman relies on
argument by anecdote—anecdote after anecdote after
anecdote—and argument by assertion. This is not, I
think, simply a consequence of the fact that this
particular book is composed of newspaper columns. It
would seem to be his customary style. One example from
his Lexus and the Olive Tree , which is more
deliberately constructed as a book, I found particularly
striking, especially since it resonates with his
condemnations in Longitudes & Attitudes of the
stupid, the misguided and the malevolent who do not
understand or accept the inexorability of globalization:
“There is no Third Way. There is only one way—the
balanced way.” (I still think Margaret Thatcher said it
better—TINA, “There Is No Alternative.”)
Despite his
declaration that we, all of us, inhabit a world
undergoing radical transformation, Friedman himself is
not, or so it seems to me, immune to lapsing into a
certain kind of fundamentalist backlash:
But most of
all, of course, I was angry that the America I had grown
up in would never be quite the same for my two daughters
aged thirteen and sixteen. . . It was a new world
knocking—not one that I had grown up in, but one my
girls would now grow up in—and I didn’t want to let it
in. (Diary, 298-9; see also September 25, 2001)
It is this
reaction which begins, I think, to explain the otherwise
odd homage to one of his high-school teachers in the
scene-setting segment of his book (January 9, 2001).
In
contemplating his homage, I do not mean to suggest
either that his journalism teacher, Hattie M. Steinberg,
is not deserving of his public thanks and praise or that
he, Friedman, is entirely insincere in proffering these.
But—perhaps it is my age—it is quite a shock to
encounter Friedman’s account of the world as he saw it
in the tenth grade in 1969 America. He was clearly
already aware that there was a troubling world out
there. His first published story in the school
newspaper, based on a lecture he attended on the Six-Day
War and an interview with the lecturer, Ariel Sharon,
reveals that he already had been made acquainted with
massive violence. But one would never guess from what he
says in this chapter or in the related sections of his
Diary, that he arrived at the age of reason in Sixties
America, at a time when the United States was riven over
Vietnam, or that before he would graduate from college
there would be secret wars and Watergate and so much
else. Friedman’s America of his youth sounds more like a
regurgitation of some complaint he heard from his
fifties-era parents, about how wonderful things used to
be back in their youth. But as Raymond Williams has
shown in his exploration of pastoral bliss, it always
existed yesterday.
Nevertheless,
it surely staggers belief in those who experienced the
sixties in America to be told that they lived through a
Golden Age. Perhaps his myth mongering is no more than
an accompaniment to the fact that he and those he deeply
cares for are now experiencing in ways he cannot accept
the inexorable change he elsewhere celebrates. But I
fear he is also trying to (re)construct a myth of
America the beautiful, of an idyllic United States that
never really was, not only to encourage his fellow
citizens as they wage “World War III” (September 13,
2001) but also to employ it as a weapon against his
enemies in the war between good and evil. It also
serves, perhaps, to emphasize the grandeur of Friedman’s
own struggle. For, his pre-9/11 America is a veritable
Garden of Eden. And we all know who it was who brought
about the fall of the first one.
I say “his
enemies”—which on the basis of this present book are
legion—because again and again in Longitudes &
Attitudes Friedman is clearly seeking to define who
and what the enemy is for the U.S. political leadership
and the U.S. public, or at least the influential
Times-reading public. He is urging them to make his
struggle their own. But this brings us to another
problem with the book he has constructed. When one
encounters only after the space of several days yet
another excoriation of most of the Middle Eastern Arab
leaders or Islamic religious leaders and followers, one
has had sufficient time to think of other things and
perhaps even encounter other views, some perhaps
harsher, perhaps some not so harsh. It is a very
different matter when one encounters repetition after
repetition of Friedman’s assertions within the space of
a few pages. Perhaps if one were to read the book over
the space of, say, a calendar year, one would view it
differently. But who reads books as one reads newspaper
columns, especially books purporting to be topical and
relevant, in this fashion. And surely Friedman did not
want his book to be read that way.
So it has to
be said that as a book Friedman’s enterprise fails
because it is just too blatantly manipulative. As a
book, it has some of the relentlessness of religious
fanaticism—which is awfully hard to take. Had he or an
editor been more selective, the outcome might have been
somewhat different—though even selectivity would not
have eliminated other of the failings I have noted. Here
it has to be noted again, that to the 92 reprinted
columns Friedman adds an 85-page Diary, which adds
almost nothing significant to what has gone before,
though it does permit him to express with even greater
prolixity notions he has already conveyed several times
and to provide us even more views of him being received
in a royal Saudi tent or in a Jordanian palace or
mingling with Israeli “terrorist experts,” or
encountering admiring fans. But books, especially
nowadays, do not just happen. They are the product of at
least some economic thought and market calculation. The
very failure to be selective, to exercise constraint,
thus would seem to be not so much an error of judgment
as an error of character. Perhaps it is merely the error
of pursuing one’s own material advantage a little bit
too vigorously?
But I fear it
may be something worse in one who so evidently aspires
to provide political leadership: vanity, “the need
personally to stand in the foreground as clearly as
possible,” as Weber put it. For consider the way in
which he concludes his Diary and his book, a story told
to him by a fellow Times journalist about his
visit down into the dark depths beneath Ground Zero.
There, on a bench adjacent to some derelict and some
destroyed PATH cars, a newspaper, a New York Times,
open, would you believe it, at Friedman’s 11 September
column, “Walls.” As his colleague told him, “When I saw
that headline on your column—it just really hit me that
this is what it was all about” (378-9). So now we know.
The real target, the real occasion for the attacks of
9/11 was Thomas Friedman himself, Friedman of the
Times, and his ideas. One would probably never have
suspected that from his columns. So perhaps, despite its
many flaws it’s a good thing he has published his book.
Otherwise we might never have known how to properly
interpret his writings or understand the true depths of
his fears and his passions or the true greatness of his
self-assigned task.
|